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use#LAASHROUDED ATTRIBUTES, CONSUMER MYOPIA,
AND INFORMATION SUPPRESSION
IN COMPETITIVE MARKETS*
XAVIER GABAIX AND DAVID LAIBSON
Bayesian consumers infer that hidden add-on prices (e.g., the cost of ink for
a printer) are likely to be high prices. If consumers are Bayesian, ﬁrms will not
shroud information in equilibrium. However, shrouding may occur in an economy
with some myopic (or unaware) consumers. Such shrouding creates an inefﬁ-
ciency, which ﬁrms may have an incentive to eliminate by educating their com-
petitors’ customers. However, if add-ons have close substitutes, a “curse of debi-
asing” arises, and ﬁrms will not be able to proﬁtably debias consumers by un-
shrouding add-ons. In equilibrium, two kinds of exploitation coexist. Optimizing
ﬁrms exploit myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high-
priced add-ons. In turn, sophisticated consumers exploit these marketing
schemes. It is not possible to proﬁtably drive away the business of sophisticates.
It is also not possible to proﬁtably lure either myopes or sophisticates to nonex-
ploitative ﬁrms. We show that informational shrouding ﬂourishes even in highly
competitive markets, even in markets with costless advertising, and even when
the shrouding generates allocational inefﬁciencies.
I. INTRODUCTION
When consumers make mistakes, ﬁrms will try to exploit
those mistakes.
1 In some markets, competitive pressure may
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1. A growing literature models markets in which sophisticated ﬁrms interact
with consumers who may have psychological biases. For example, see Campbell
[2006], DellaVigna and Malmendier [2004], Gabaix, Laibson, and Li [2005], Glae-
ser [2005], Heidhues and Koszegi [2005], Jin and Leslie [2003], Koszegi and Rabin
[forthcoming], Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005], Oster and Morton [2005], Shui
and Ausubel [2004], Spiegler [2004], and Ellison [forthcoming] for an overview.
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505undermine such exploitation.
2 For example, competing ﬁrms
could reveal the exploitation and win over customers. In this
paper we identify when such competitive debiasing will and will
not occur. We study the market for add-ons—e.g., printer car-
tridges—and develop ideas related to one proposed by Ellison
[2005, subsection V.C], who suggests that some consumers do not
think about add-ons when they buy a base good. We formalize
this consumer error and determine when competition will lead to
debiasing.
Our paper is motivated by the observation that ﬁrms choose
to hide information from consumers. For example, banks promi-
nently advertise the virtues of their accounts, but the marketing
materials do not highlight the costs of such an account which
include ATM usage fees, bounced check fees, minimum balance
fees, etc. Banks could compete on these costs, but they instead
choose to shroud them. Indeed, many bank customers do not
learn the details of the fee structure until long after they have
opened their accounts.
Cruickshank [2000] reports results of a U. K. Treasury sur-
vey that investigates the origins of high fees in the U. K. banking
sector. Half of the respondents report having no information
about the fees for common ﬁnancial services at their own bank.
3
The report concludes that “In the markets to supply banking
services to personal customers [. . .] few consumers are aware of
the terms and conditions of the products they hold, pointing to
signiﬁcant information problems.”
The printer market operates in a similar way. Printer manu-
facturers advertise the low price of their ink-jet printers, but do
not compete on the principal cost of ownership: patented ink
cartridges that cost ten times more than the printer itself over the
life of the product. Hall [2003] reports that only 3 percent of
printer owners claim to know the printing cost at the time they
buy their printers. Indeed, printer manufacturers try to make
these costs invisible. For example, the printing cost of personal
Hewlett-Packard desk-jet printers is not easily accessible on the
company’s web site. From each printer’s home page, one must
follow a complex sequence of links to uncover the cost of printing.
Such shrouding does not reﬂect exogenous communication costs.
2. See Becker [1957] and Laibson and Yariv [2005].
3. Respondents were asked “How accurately do you feel you know the charge
for services on your account?” Response categories included: “Exactly,” “Roughly,”
“Not at all,” and “Did not apply.” About half of respondents choose “Not at all.”
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printer home page—using the click metric—than any other in-
formation about the printer.
At ﬁrst glance, shrouding add-on prices seems like a natural
marketing strategy. However, if consumers are all rational (or
aware), shrouding should actually hurt the bank or printer manu-
facturer, because rational consumers will expect the worse from a
ﬁrm that shrouds [Jovanovic 1982; Milgrom 1981]. Any informa-
tion that is hidden in the ﬁne print—or excluded from marketing
materials altogether—is not likely to be favorable to consumers.
Rational consumers will infer that hidden prices are likely to be
high prices. Such reasoning creates an incentive for information
revelation and unraveling of shrouding. Indeed, all ﬁrms choose
to unshroud their prices in equilibria with rational consumers.
We show that shrouding behavior will arise if “myopic” con-
sumers incompletely analyze the future game tree.
4 Some econo-
mists believe that such shrouding cannot survive [Shapiro 1995],
arguing that competitive ﬁrms should educate other ﬁrms’ cus-
tomers, offer those customers efﬁcient pricing schemes, and con-
sequently win their business. In contrast, we show that the exis-
tence of myopic consumers creates equilibrium shrouding that is
immune to such competitive pressure.
We derive conditions under which competitive price cutting
and educational advertising will not occur in equilibrium. We
show that debiased consumers prefer to give their business to
ﬁrms with high shrouded prices because these sophisticated con-
sumers end up with a subsidy from policies designed for myopic
customers [DellaVigna and Malmendier 2004, forthcoming].
5
To develop intuition for our results, consider a hotel room
that costs Hilton $100 to supply. Suppose that all consumers are
initially myopic (i.e., they do not think about add-ons when they
plan a hotel visit). When such a customer stays at Hilton, she
ends up paying $20 to purchase add-ons like parking, telecom-
munications, room service, etc. Without loss of generality, assume
that these add-ons cost Hilton nothing to provide. In a competi-
tive market, Hilton will then advertise “Hilton’s rooms cost only
4. Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg [forthcoming] analyze a model of
partially myopic exploration of game trees. For the lack of Bayesian updating,
Simmons and Lynch [1991] present experimental evidence, and Malmendier and
Shanthikumar [2005] ﬁeld evidence.
5. In DellaVigna and Malmendier [2004, forthcoming] cross subsidies arise
from self-control problems. Naive consumers who do not recognize their self-
control problems cross-subsidize sophisticated consumers who do.
507 SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES AND CONSUMER MYOPIA$80,” neglecting to mention the costly add-ons that effectively
raise its revenue. In competitive equilibrium, Hilton’s costs
($100) equal Hilton’s total revenues ($80  $20).
Now consider another hotel chain, called Transparent, that is
picking a business strategy. Transparent could tell consumers
about the shrouded add-ons that consumers pay for at Hilton.
6
Transparent could advertise, “Watch out for add-on prices at our
competitors. Transparent’s add-ons are all free.” Naturally, if
Transparent did this, they could not subsidize their room fees
with add-on revenue. An aggressive transparency strategy would
be to charge $100 for rooms and nothing for add-ons.
Unfortunately, this efﬁcient pricing scheme might not attract
any customers. Once consumers understand the high mark-up
strategy of Hilton, consumers might prefer to stay at Hilton and
simply substitute away from add-on consumption. A “sophisti-
cated” customer anticipates the marked up add-ons at Hilton and
avoids buying many of them (e.g., she brings a cell phone instead
of relying on the hotel phone, she takes a taxi instead of renting
a car that requires parking, etc.). Suppose that the economic cost
of such substitution is $10. In this case, Hilton’s newly educated
customers prefer to stay at Hilton rather than defecting to mar-
ginal cost pricing at Transparent. Hilton’s educated customers
receive a $100 room for $80 and only have to endure a little
inconvenience (worth $10) to avoid buying Hilton’s overpriced
add-ons. So Transparent’s education campaign hurts Hilton—
which sells fewer add-ons—but helps Hilton’s customers, who are
taught to substitute away from add-ons.
7 After the educational
advertising campaign, nobody defects to Transparent, even
though Transparent has marginal-cost pricing. Hilton is a better
deal for sophisticated consumers. Hence, Transparent’s un-
shrouding/advertising campaign does not attract any business.
The present paper generalizes this example.
8
This example also illustrates the curse of debiasing. This
curse occurs whenever debiasing makes a consumer less proﬁt-
able for the debiasing ﬁrm. Sophisticated consumers tend to be
less proﬁtable because they know how to avoid unnecessary costs.
6. For concreteness, assume that all consumers receive and understand this
message and assume that advertising is free. However, the example works no
matter what fraction 0  1 of consumers get the message and no matter what
it costs to place such advertisements.
7. Of course, Hilton would like to screen out such sophisticated consumers,
but this is typically not possible.
8. In the notation of Section II, c  100, c ˆ  0, 0, e  10, 0,  
(0,1], p  80, and p ˆ  p   20.
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and competition will not lead consumers to behave rationally.
There are many markets in which ﬁrms do not have an incentive
to educate their own customers or even the customers of their
competitors. Consider the illustrative example above. Debiased
Hilton customers, get a $100 hotel room for a price of $80 plus $10
of inconvenience. Hence, the debiased consumer has no reason to
defect to Transparent. Accordingly, Transparent (or Hilton) has
no incentive to educate Hilton’s myopic consumers in the ﬁrst
place. Debiasing a consumer is good for the consumer and bad for
both ﬁrms. Neither ﬁrm has an incentive to do it.
9
In essence, we show that there are two kinds of exploitation.
Firms exploit myopic consumers. In turn, when consumers be-
come sophisticated, they take advantage of these exploitative
ﬁrms. Finally, when sophisticated consumers exist, ﬁrms cannot
rid themselves of them.
10 In equilibrium, nobody has an incentive
to deviate except the myopic consumers. But the myopes do not
know any better, and often nobody has an incentive to show them
the error of their ways. Educating a myopic consumer turns him
into a (less proﬁtable) sophisticated consumer who prefers to go to
ﬁrms with loss-leader base-good pricing and high-priced (but
avoidable) add-ons. Hence, education does not help the educating
ﬁrm.
This mechanism applies to a wide range of markets. An
educated banking customer gets the beneﬁt of a $50 gift for
opening an account and avoids paying some of the fees that snare
myopic consumers. An educated credit card holder gets conve-
nience, ﬂoat, and miles and avoids paying interest charges and
late payment fees.
11 An educated home printer buyer gets a
9. Another example of the curse of debiasing occurs in mutual funds. If a
mutual fund company explains that stock picking is not effective and that fees are
the primary predictable component in risk-adjusted returns, a newly educated
consumer will decide to buy an index fund—a very competitive, and relatively
unproﬁtable, segment of the market. Educating the consumer transforms him into
an unproﬁtable consumer, and for-proﬁt companies will not want to implement
such education [Gabaix, Laibson, and Li 2005].
10. In the example above, Hilton cannot drive away educated consumers
without also losing its myopic consumers.
11. In recent years, a new shrouding ploy has emerged. For example, Chase
offers 0 percent Annual Percentage Rate (APR) on transferred balances. In a
footnote in their ads the company acknowledges that “we apply payments to
introductory balances before balances with higher APRs [. . .] Learn more about
rates, fees, and other cost information by reviewing Pricing & Terms.” In the ﬁne
print of Pricing & Terms, Chase reports, “You authorize us to allocate your
payments and credits in a way that is most favorable or convenient for us. For
example, you authorize us to apply your payments and credits to balances with
lower APRs (such as promotional APRs) before balances with higher APRs.”
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ments (by printing in black and white instead of color, printing in
draft mode, or printing fewer large jobs at home).
12 In such
markets educated consumers prefer to stick with the ﬁrms that
feature high add-on prices, since these ﬁrms have loss-leader
base-good prices, and the educated consumer can partially sub-
stitute away from the overpriced add-ons.
Our analysis shows why high add-on markups will persist in
markets with numerous competitors and free advertising. This
prediction distinguishes our model from standard search models,
which imply that ﬁrms have an incentive to disseminate infor-
mation about their products and choose not to do so only if such
dissemination is costly (e.g., Bagwell [2005], Butters [1977],
Lazear [1995], Salop and Stiglitz [1977], and Stahl [1989]).
13 We
identify conditions under which ﬁrms will choose not to advertise
and hence not compete by lowering add-on prices, even when
advertising is free. This explains why industries with nearly
costless marginal information dissemination still shroud their
add-on prices. In a search model with only rational consumers,
ﬁrms will choose to disclose all of their information if they can do
so costlessly. In our model, with enough myopic consumers,
shrouding is the more proﬁtable strategy.
As we have explained, our explanation for add-on shrouding
and high markups depends on the presence of myopic consum-
ers.
14 In contrast, many authors have developed rational actor
models that explain why add-ons have high markups. However,
Sophisticates can take advantage of this scheme by transferring a balance to
Chase and never using the Chase card to make a purchase. In contrast, myopes
may fail to realize that they can only repay their new credit card charges (which
may accumulate at a high interest rate) after they have repaid their introductory
balance (which accumulates at a 0 percent interest rate). We thank Robert Barro
for pointing out this example.
12. A sophisticated consumer could also purchase the add-on from a third
party, at some transaction cost. This is why base-good ﬁrms often hinder such
third-party transactions. See Salop [1993] and Hall [2003] for examples.
13. This can be viewed as the key difference between modeling bounded
rationality as search costs (e.g., Salop and Stiglitz [1977]), and modeling it directly
as failure to anticipate an attribute as in our model. In the search cost approach,
if ﬁrms can costlessly educate the consumers, they will do so because consumers
are Bayesian. If a ﬁrm goes out of its way to sustain high search costs, Salop and
Stiglitz consumers will rationally infer that it has something to hide. So, if
advertising costs are low, all ﬁrms reveal information to consumers.
14. In contrast, Ayres and Nalebuff [2003] propose that high add-on prices
are partially due to myopic choices on the part of ﬁrms, which would make more
proﬁts if they had low add-on prices and consequently developed a good
reputation.
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shroud add-on prices. Two types of explanations for high markups
ﬁgure prominently in the literature: high exogenous search
costs
15 and an inability to commit.
16
Ellison [2005] proposes a rational price-discrimination model
in which add-on pricing enables ﬁrms to charge high demand
consumers relatively more than low demand consumers.
17 In
Ellison’s model, exogenous search costs make it costly for con-
sumers to observe add-on prices. High add-on markups raise
proﬁts by facilitating price discrimination. However, Ellison
points out that high markups will not be sustainable when infor-
mation transmission is inexpensive (i.e., when search costs are
exogenously small, see Stole [2005]). To handle this case, Ellison
suggests an extension that would incorporate unsophisticated
consumers who would not buy a base good if they anticipated its
total cost including the add-on.
We propose a related model that provides another reason
that advertising will reduce sales to formerly irrational consum-
ers. Our model generates a “curse of debiasing”: educating a
consumer about competitors’ add-on schemes effectively teaches
that consumer how to proﬁtably exploit those schemes, thereby
making it impossible for the educating ﬁrm to proﬁtably attract
the newly educated consumer. In our setting, unsophisticated
consumers fail to take the add-on into account when comparing
products. Hence, they only compare the prices of base goods
across ﬁrms, instead of comparing the total prices (base good plus
add-on). When add-ons are made salient—e.g., through advertis-
ing—our newly educated consumers do not exit the market, but
instead make a more informed choice among the available goods.
Our analysis identiﬁes conditions under which no ﬁrm has an
incentive to educate consumers in this way.
Section II deﬁnes a shrouded attribute and presents an equi-
librium analysis of a market with discrete demand for add-ons.
15. Search-cost models imply that ﬁrms choose high add-on prices because it
is exogenously costly for consumers to observe add-on prices before they buy the
base good [Diamond 1971; Lal and Matutes 1994; Stahl 1989; Hortacsu and
Syverson 2004]. In contrast, our model generates voluntary information
suppression.
16. The literature on commitment shows that ﬁrms choose high add-on prices
if ﬁrms cannot commit to add-on prices at the time the base good is sold [Boren-
stein, MacKie-Mason, and Netz 1995; Farrell and Klemperer 2005; Klemperer
1987]. In our analysis however, we consider the polar case in which ﬁrms can
commit to an add-on price.
17. See Ellison and Ellison [2004] for related empirical analysis.
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continuous demand for add-ons. Section IV discusses the mea-
surement and regulation of shrouded markets. Section V con-
cludes. All proofs are presented in appendices.
II. SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES:D EFINITIONS AND A MODEL
We analyze a market in which ﬁrms can shroud attributes of
their products. These shrouded attributes are not taken into
consideration by some potential customers. For example, a bank
might suppress information about minimum balance fees in the
bank’s marketing materials. Some consumers will neglect to con-
sider such fees when picking a bank. For the purposes of our
model, a shrouded attribute is a product attribute that is hidden
by a ﬁrm, even though the attribute could be nearly costlessly
revealed.
18 The Hewlett-Packard decision to omit the desk-jet
price per page on their web site is an example of such information
suppression.
Shrouded attributes may include surcharges, fees, penalties,
accessories, options, or any other hidden feature of the ongoing
relationship between a consumer and a ﬁrm. We divide this list
into two mutually exclusive categories: (avoidable) add-ons and
(unavoidable) surcharges.
The analysis in this paper primarily discusses add-ons, the
ﬁrst type of shrouded attribute. Add-ons are complementary
goods that consumers have the option to avoid. For example, hotel
guests can avoid paying telephone charges if they instead use cell
phones. Likewise, hotel guests can avoid paying for room service
meals by ﬁnding local restaurants. Both hotel phone use and
hotel room service complement a hotel stay. Such complementary
(voluntary) goods are referred to as add-ons.
In our modeling, we distinguish between a “base good” and
the shrouded attribute. In the preceding example, the base good
is a hotel room and the shrouded attributes are hotel services. We
assume that myopic consumers pick a base good without consid-
ering shrouded attributes.
19
18. More generally, communication costs need to be low enough so that
unshrouding would occur in an equilibrium with rational consumers.
19. A consumer can compare prices of closely located four star hotels on a web
travel site (e.g., Orbitz), without observing the hotels’ add-on pricing schedules.
See Ayres and Nalebuff [2003].
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Game
We now discuss a model with discrete demand for the add-on.
We postpone the general case—i.e., continuous demand—to sub-
section III.B. We start by providing an overview of the timing of
the discrete demand game. We discuss the details of the game
after the timeline.
Period 0:
● Firms decide to make information about the add-on
shrouded or unshrouded. This is a binary choice. Un-
shrouding a price is equivalent to advertising that price. To
make unshrouding/advertising maximally attractive to the
ﬁrm, we assume that unshrouding is free.
20
● Firms pick prices for a base good (p) and an add-on (p ˆ).
Period 1:
● Sophisticated consumers (fraction 1 1 of the popu-
lation) always take the add-on and its price into considera-
tion.
21 If information about the add-on is shrouded, sophis-
ticates form Bayesian posteriors about the unobserved
add-on.
● Myopic consumers (fraction  of the population) only con-
sider the add-on if they directly observe the add-on infor-
mation. When the add-on is shrouded, myopes do not ob-
serve the add-on information. When the add-on is un-
shrouded, fraction   (0,1] of myopes observes the add-on
information.
● Consumers choose a ﬁrm.
● Consumers can initiate costly behavior (effort cost e) that
enables them to substitute away from future use of the
add-on.
Period 2:
● Consumers observe the add-on price (if they have not ob-
served it already) and are given an opportunity to pur-
chase the add-on. Consumers who previously engaged in
costly substitution behavior have a lower incentive to pur-
chase the add-on.
20. We revisit this assumption in subsection III.D.
21. We assume that 0 because the analysis is of interest only when there
are myopic consumers. Also, when 0, many combinations of p and p ˆ are
equivalent, as the equilibrium determines only p  p ˆ.
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To motivate the model, we will discuss the example of a bank,
but the model applies to any setting in which ﬁrms offer add-ons
to their customers.
Period 0: In period 0, banks set and potentially shroud
prices. Let p represent the price of a base good, which in our
example is the price of opening a bank account. Let p ˆ represent
the price of an add-on. In our example, violating the minimum
balance is an add-on service with price p ˆ.
22 Both p and p ˆ are
chosen by each bank in period 0. Without loss of generality, we
assume that banks have zero marginal cost of opening an account
or of having an account-holder violate the minimum balance
threshold.
Each bank may shroud or unshroud its minimum balance
fee. If the bank chooses to shroud p ˆ, the minimum balance fee will
not be seen by potential consumers. For example, p ˆ may be
hidden in ﬁne print or published in an obscure location. One can
think of this action as creating a gratuitous search cost that is
large enough so that few consumers bother to see the add-on
price. Without loss of generality, we assume that shrouding im-
plies that no consumer observes the add-on price.
The bank may alternatively costlessly advertise p ˆ, thereby
revealing it to all sophisticated consumers and to  fraction of
myopic consumers, with 0  1. Without loss of generality we
assume that  is ﬁxed. We allow  to be weakly less than unity to
reﬂect the possibility that myopes—who may not initially recog-
nize the value of information about the add-on market—may
overlook that information even when it is made available. We
deﬁne informed myopes as the myopes who have seen (and noted)
unshrouded information about the add-on. Informed myopes be-
have exactly like sophisticated consumers. Analogously, we de-
ﬁne uninformed myopes as those myopes who have not seen
information about the add-on. Hence, when information is un-
shrouded by one or more ﬁrms, a fraction  of myopes is in-
formed—and therefore become sophisticated—and a fraction 1 
 of myopes is uninformed. Hence unshrouding by any ﬁrm in-
22. In U. S. banks, a typical minimum balance fee is $10 and applies in
months when an account balance falls below some minimum that is strictly
greater than zero. A minimum balance fee is distinct from an overdraft fee, a
bounced-check fee, or an insufﬁcient funds fee. Those fees apply to cases in which
customers would like to use funds that they do not have in their accounts.
Naturally, the model discussed here applies to those fees as well.
514 QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICScreases the sophistication of the pool of potential customers
shared by all ﬁrms.
23
Period 1: Consumers pick a ﬁrm from which to buy the base
good. Sophisticates always take the existence of the add-on into
consideration, forming Bayesian posteriors about the add-on
when its price is shrouded. Myopes only consider the add-on if it
is revealed to them.
For a consumer, taking account of the add-on generates two
sources of value. First, a consumer can consider add-on pricing
when choosing a ﬁrm. Second, a consumer who anticipates or
observes high add-on prices can exert costly effort e  0 in period
1 and thereby substitute away from the add-on. For example, a
consumer who faces a high minimum balance fee could transfer
balances into the account or cut back withdrawals so that the fee
is less likely to be invoked.
We assume that add-on fee p ˆ is effectively bounded above by
p   e.
24 For example, if a customer is forced to pay a high fee, the
customer might terminate her relationship with the bank or lodge
a complaint. Legal and regulatory constraints also limit the pen-
alties/fees that banks can charge. Finally, p  could represent the
cost of a last-minute consumer intervention that enables the
consumer to avoid purchasing the add-on.
We assume that sophisticates and informed myopes are
aware of the add-on fee. Hence, sophisticates and informed
myopes will exert substitution effort e if e  Ep ˆ.
25
Let xi represent the anticipated net surplus from opening an
account at bank i less the anticipated net surplus from opening
an account at the best alternative bank (ignoring idiosyncratic
taste differences). Throughout the paper we use starred variables
to represent the (symmetric) prices set by other ﬁrms. We analyze
symmetric equilibria in this paper.
26
For sophisticated consumers,
xi  	pi  min 
Ep ˆ,e  	p*  min 
Ep ˆ*,e,
23. Assuming that the impact of advertising is more local would not change
our results.
24. If the add-on is unavoidable (e  p ) and consumers are not all sophisti-
cated (1, 0), then the proof of Proposition 1 shows that there is a unique
sequential equilibrium, which has Shrouded Prices and p  p   , p ˆ  p .
25. We assume local risk neutrality throughout the paper. Also, it is impor-
tant that informed myopes behave like sophisticates.
26. Technically, our equilibrium is a sequential equilibrium, as detailed in
the preamble of the proof of Proposition 1.
515 SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES AND CONSUMER MYOPIAwhere Ep ˆ and Ep ˆ* are the rational expectations about the add-on
price of the ﬁrm, and its competitors, respectively. When the
add-on information is unshrouded, expectations are equal to the
true value of the add-on price. When the add-on information is
shrouded, sophisticated consumers solve the Bayesian equilib-
rium to calculate Ep ˆ and Ep ˆ*.
27
Myopic consumers fall into two classes. When add-on prices are
unshrouded, a fraction  of myopes becomes informed. These in-
formed myopes behave just like sophisticates with Ep ˆ  p ˆ. A myope
who was educated by ﬁrm i becomes sophisticated in his behavior
vis-a `-vis all ﬁrms. However, even when add-on information is un-
shrouded, a fraction 1 of myopes remains uninformed. When
add-on information is shrouded, all myopes are uninformed.
For uninformed myopes,
xi  pi  p*.
Uninformed myopes neglect the add-on when deciding where to
open their bank account. Likewise, uninformed myopic consum-
ers do not consider exerting substitution effort e in period 1.
Let D(xi) represent the probability that a consumer opens an
account at bank i. Recall that xi represents the average antici-
pated net surplus from opening an account at bank i less the
average anticipated net surplus from opening an account at the
best alternative bank. The demand function D is strictly increas-
ing, bounded below by zero, and bounded above by one. Appendix
1 presents a microfoundation of the demand function. The de-
mand function allows us to ﬂexibly parameterize the degree of
competition in the industry, via the quantity D(0)/D(0),
which will turn out to be equal to the average proﬁt per consumer.
In particular, perfect competition corresponds to 0.
Period 2: Consumers observe the add-on price (if they have
not observed it already) and are given an opportunity to purchase
the add-on. Consumers who have engaged in substitution in
period 1 do not purchase the add-on. All other consumers pur-
chase the add-on at price p ˆ.
28
27. We commit some abuse of language here. When the add-on information is
shrouded, the sophisticated consumers’ beliefs are part of a consistent assessment
(i.e., a strategic proﬁle and a belief system), in particular they anticipate perfectly
the price that the ﬁrm charges in equilibrium.
28. Alternatively, we could assume that uninformed myopes buy the add-on
in period 2 without observing the price: i.e., the myopes believe that the unob-
served add-on price is low enough to justify the purchase.
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We now characterize the symmetric sequential equilibrium of
this game.
29 Let  represent the share of myopic consumers in the
marketplace. The following proposition shows that ﬁrms will choose
high markups in the add-on market. In the Shrouded Prices Equi-
librium, ﬁrms will choose markups that are so high that the sophis-
ticated consumers substitute out of the add-on market.
PROPOSITION 1. Let
(1) 
†  e/p 
and
(2)   D0/D0.
If the fraction of myopic consumers  is greater than 
†, there
exists a symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms shroud the
add-on price. Call this the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium. The
prices of the base good and the add-on are, respectively,
(3) p  p   
(4) p ˆ  p .
In this equilibrium only myopes purchase the add-on. The
allocation is inefﬁcient since sophisticates substitute away
from the add-on.
If the fraction of myopic consumers  is less than 
†, there
exists a symmetric equilibrium in which ﬁrms do not shroud the
add-on price. Call this the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium. The
prices of the base good and the add-on are, respectively,
(5) p  e  
(6) p ˆ  e.
In this equilibrium all consumers purchase the add-on, so the
equilibrium is efﬁcient. In each of these equilibria the beliefs
of sophisticated consumers and educated myopes are p ˆ  p 
for the add-on price at a ﬁrm that shrouds, independently of
its base-good price. Also, the total proﬁts of the industry
are .
29. The proof of Proposition 1, in Appendix 2, provides the details of the
strategies and beliefs.
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Proposition 1 characterizes a Shrouded Prices Equilibrium
30
in which ﬁrms choose inefﬁciently high markups in the add-on
market and choose to shroud those add-on prices.
31 In the
Shrouded Prices Equilibrium, ﬁrms set p ˆ*  p , though the mar-
ginal cost of producing the add-on is 0. This equilibrium is inef-
ﬁcient since the sophisticates pay effort cost e to substitute away
from add-on consumption (see subsection II.D below).
Our model reproduces the well-known result that high mark-
ups for the add-on are offset by low or negative markups on the
base good.
32 This is easiest to see when the market is approxi-
mately competitive (i.e., the demand curve is highly elastic, and
hence  is close to zero). In a relatively competitive market with
small , the base good is always a loss leader with a negative
markup: p*   p   0o rp*  e  0. The model implies that
the add-on will be the “proﬁt-center” and the base good will be the
“loss leader.”
33
Our model also predicts equilibrium shrouding, as conjec-
tured by Ellison [2005]. Other previous authors have conjectured
that the availability of inexpensive advertising would drive down
aftermarket prices and eliminate shrouding. For example, Sha-
piro [1995] describes the inefﬁciency caused by high markups in
the aftermarket and then observes that competition and adver-
tising should drive them away.
Furthermore, manufacturers in a competitive equipment market have
incentives to avoid even this inefﬁciency by providing information to con-
sumers. A manufacturer could capture proﬁts by raising its [base-good]
prices above market levels (i.e., closer to cost), lowering its aftermarket prices
below market levels (i.e., closer to cost), and informing buyers that its overall
systems price is at or below market. In this fashion, the manufacturer could
eliminate some or all of the deadweight loss, attract consumers by offering a
lower total cost of ownership, and still capture as proﬁts some of the elimi-
30. It is easy to see that if  
† and there is a small cost of
unshrouding, then the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium is the unique symmetric
sequential equilibrium. When  is large enough, another equilibrium exists.
Speciﬁcally, when 
†   , the Shrouded Prices and Unshrouded Prices
Equilibria both exist.
31. For empirical applications, we reexpress Proposition 1 in the case where
the marginal costs c and c ˆ  e are not zero. In this case, if 
†, p  c  (p  
c ˆ)  , and if 
†, p  c  c ˆ  e  . The value of p ˆ does not change.
32. See the literature review in the present paper and in Ellison [2005].
33. In many seemingly competitive markets the price of the base good is
typically set below its marginal cost (e.g., printer, hotel, car rental, ﬁnancial
services), while the price of the add-on is set well above its marginal cost (printer
cartridge, hotel phone call, gas charge, minimum balance fee).
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power, the manufacturers have a direct incentive to eliminate even the small
inefﬁciency caused by poor consumer information [Shapiro 1995, p. 495].
In the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium, Shapiro’s intuition
about inefﬁciency applies, but his anticipated unshrouding effects
are overturned by other forces. In general, high markups in the
aftermarket do not go away as a result of competition or
advertising.
Why does Shapiro’s unshrouding effect not arise? Shapiro
conjectures that ﬁrms will compete by advertising low add-on
prices, thereby attracting consumers by highlighting the beneﬁts
of efﬁciently priced add-ons.
However, Proposition 1 shows that this competitive effect is
overturned by a “curse of debiasing.” Speciﬁcally, educated con-
sumers would prefer to frequent ﬁrms with high add-on prices
that they can avoid rather than defecting to ﬁrms with marginal
cost pricing of both the base good and the add-on.
Again consider the illustrative case of perfect competition,
0. If a sophisticated consumer gives her business to a ﬁrm
with shrouded market prices, the sophisticated consumer’s sur-
plus will be
sophisticated surplus  p  e
 p   e
 p   p   0.
By contrast, if the sophisticated consumer gives her business to a
ﬁrm with zero markups on both the base-good and the add-on, the
sophisticate’s surplus will be exactly 0.
34 So the sophisticated/
educated consumer is strictly better off at the ﬁrm with shrouded
prices (and high add-on markups), than at the ﬁrm with marginal
cost pricing.
This preference for the ﬁrms with high markups reﬂects the
fact that the sophisticated consumers are subsidized by pricing
policies designed for uninformed myopic consumers. Educating
uninformed myopes enables them to get more value out of their
relationships with high markup ﬁrms. After education, myopes
anticipate the high add-on prices, and hence substitute away
from add-ons while still enjoying loss-leader prices on the base
34. The particular value of a 0 surplus depends on the choice of normaliza-
tion. If we shift all utilities by a factor V, the surplus will be V.
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and avoid the high fees.
35
This generates the curse of debiasing. A ﬁrm does not beneﬁt
by debiasing uninformed myopic consumers. Newly educated con-
sumers (i.e., sophisticates) are not proﬁtable to any ﬁrm. Specif-
ically, sophisticates prefer to patronize—and in particular, ex-
ploit—ﬁrms that offer loss-leader prices on base goods.
This intuitive analysis explores pricing deviations in which a
ﬁrm tries to educate and attract myopes from other ﬁrms (using
low markups as the lure). Naturally, equilibrium analysis must
also analyze deviations in which a ﬁrm with high markups tries
to drive away (money-losing) sophisticates. Naturally, both devia-
tions must be considered in the proofs of Proposition 1.
In summary, the presence of uninformed myopic consumers
incentivizes ﬁrms to adopt pricing schedules that have the unin-
tended consequence of subsidizing sophisticates. Making more
myopes sophisticated will not help any ﬁrm. Because of this curse
of debiasing, no ﬁrm has an incentive to educate myopes, even
when education is costless.
II.D. Welfare
We now provide a welfare analysis of the Shrouded Prices
Equilibrium and highlight the inefﬁciency of this equilibrium.
36
PROPOSITION 2. In the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium the social
welfare loss is (1  )e. Sophisticated consumers are
p   e units better off than myopic consumers. In the Un-
shrouded Prices Equilibrium, there is no inefﬁciency, and all
consumers are equally well-off.
Proof of Proposition 2. The social welfare loss is proportional
(with factor e) to the fraction of agents that exerts costly effort e
to avoid consuming the add-on. Recall that the ﬁrms can produce
the add-on at 0 marginal cost. In the Shrouded Prices Equilib-
rium all of the sophisticated agents exert effort e, so the dead-
weight loss is (1  )e. Also, as sophisticates pay e to avoid
35. In Proposition 1, indeed, one needs 0, but otherwise the speciﬁc value
of  does not matter. The reason is clear from the proof. Sophisticates are less
proﬁtable than myopes, so after unshrouding an increase in the number of
sophisticates, caused by 0, reduces total proﬁts.
36. As often in welfare economics, the pricing distortion is likely to have
greater redistributional effects than net efﬁciency losses.
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better off than myopes.
In the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium no consumers exert
costly effort, and all purchase the add-on, which is produced at 0
marginal cost. There is no efﬁciency loss. 
Since the add-on can be produced at zero social cost,
37 it is
socially efﬁcient for the add-on to be consumed. If a consumer
substitutes away from the add-on (at effort cost e), then an
equilibrium is socially inefﬁcient. In the case with inefﬁciency
(
†), the welfare losses increase as the fraction of sophisti-
cates increases; in this case sophisticates do not consume the
(high-priced) add-on.
III. EXTENSIONS
In this section we discuss several extensions of the model.
First, we discuss the case in which myopes learn to become
sophisticates. Second, we analyze the case of continuous demand
for the add-on. Finally, we discuss a series of additional consid-
erations that inﬂuence the persistence of shrouding.
III.A. Learning
In some markets, myopes eventually learn the high price of
the add-on, thereby becoming sophisticates. We present an exten-
sion that reﬂects this learning process and demonstrate how
learning affects equilibrium pricing.
We adopt the same timing as before, but now we assume that
the decision about add-on consumption is repeated. Speciﬁcally,
after choosing a ﬁrm from which to buy the base good, sophisti-
cates face the add-on purchase decision TS times. For each deci-
sion, sophisticates decide whether to pay avoidance cost e or buy
the add-on for price p ˆ. Informed myopes act just like sophisti-
cates. Uninformed myopes buy the add-on TMM times.
38 They
then become sophisticates and make sophisticated choices TMS
times.
39 Our original model corresponds to TS  TMM  1 and
37. This assumption is made without loss of generality.
38. In practice, the propensity to become sophisticated should increase with
the cost of behaving myopically. This would lead to an interesting extension of the
framework.
39. In some cases it may be natural to assume that TS  TMM  TMS,
but we do not make this assumption here, the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium
does not depend on it.
521 SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES AND CONSUMER MYOPIATMS  0.
40 We assume that ﬁrms choose their shrouding policies
and prices once and for all and do not change them during the
game.
The following Proposition shows that there is a Shrouded
Prices Equilibrium if the fraction of myopes  is high.
PROPOSITION 3. Let
(7) 
†† 
e
p 
max TS,TMM  TMS
TMM
.
If 
††, then there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which
ﬁrms shroud the add-on pricing. Call this the Shrouded
Prices Equilibrium:
(8) p  p TMM  
p ˆ  p .
In this equilibrium the myopes purchase the add-on until
they become sophisticates. The allocation is socially inefﬁ-
cient since sophisticates substitute away from the add-on.
The beliefs of sophisticated consumers and educated myopes
are p ˆ  p  for the add-on price at ﬁrms that shroud.
The myopia model predicts that consumers will eventually
learn to avoid add-on fees. Agarwal et al. [2005] empirically
evaluate these dynamics, conﬁrming the prediction that add-on
fees in banks decline with customer tenure. This learning pattern
is inconsistent with the predictions of a classical price discrimi-
nation model of add-on pricing.
Our analysis raises the question of long-run dynamics. If
consumers learn to avoid add-on fees, does shrouding eventually
vanish along with high add-on prices? Several countervailing
forces may sustain shrouding in the long run. First, new genera-
tions of myopic consumers enter the market. Second, sophistica-
tion is sometimes overturned by forgetting or distraction, particu-
larly when the absolute costs of the add-on are small. Third, and
most importantly, new shrouding techniques endogenously
evolve. For example, the emphasis on fee-based revenue in the
banking sector is a recent development [Rogers and Sinkey 1999].
We believe that fees for speciﬁc add-ons have a life cycle.
When the add-on is new, it tends to be shrouded and priced above
40. See Miao [2005] for another analysis.
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price falls. Using our notation, the fraction  of myopes decreases
over time, and shrouding eventually disappears.
41
III.B. Continuous Add-on Demand
In this subsection we generalize the model to the case of
continuous demand for the add-on. We show that equilibrium
shrouding survives only when sophisticates have relatively inex-
pensive substitutes for the add-on. The structure and timing of
the game in this section mirrors the details of the original game
except for the extensions enumerated below.
Total consumer utility is decomposed into two parts: the
value of owning the base good and the cost of purchasing—or
substituting away from—the add-on. Let uai represent agent
a’s value of ﬁrm i’s base good, overlooking the add-on.
42 Let
u ˆ(e ˆai,q ˆai)  p ˆiq ˆai represent the costs associated with the add-on,
reﬂecting both the add-on quantity q ˆai and any costly efforts
e ˆai to substitute away from the add-on. The leading case is

2u ˆ(e ˆai,q ˆai)/e ˆaiq ˆai  0. The net value of buying the base good
can be written as
uai  pi
base-good utility
 u ˆe ˆai,q ˆai  p ˆiq ˆai
add-on utility
.
In period 1, sophisticated consumer a picks a ﬁrm i and
substitution effort e ˆai to maximize
Uai  uai  pi  max
e ˆai
E 
max
q ˆ ai
	u ˆe ˆai,q ˆai  p ˆiq ˆai.
In period 2, sophisticates pick q ˆ ai to maximize u ˆ(e ˆai,q ˆ ai)  p ˆ iq ˆ ai.
We call u ˆ
S(p ˆ i)  u ˆ(e ˆai,q ˆ ai) the corresponding indirect utility for
the rational expectations case in which p ˆ i  Ep ˆ i.
43
Informed myopes behave just like sophisticates, since in-
formed myopes observe the add-on information in period 1.
In contrast, uninformed myopes do not take account of the
add-on when they pick a ﬁrm i. In period 1, uninformed myopes
pick a ﬁrm i to maximize uai  pi.
Uninformed myopes passively choose a default level of sub-
41. We thank Douglas Bernheim for suggesting these life-cycle dynamics.
42. For example uai could represent the value of the base good assuming a
zero price for the add-on.
43. u ˆ
S(p ˆ i)  u ˆ(e ˆai,q ˆ ai)  u ˆ(e ˆai(Ep ˆ i),q ˆ ai(e ˆai(Ep ˆ i),p ˆ i))  u ˆ(e ˆai(p ˆ i),
q ˆ ai(e ˆai(p ˆ i),p ˆ i)).
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M which is not responsive to shrouded
variation in p ˆ i. In period 2, uninformed myopes pick q ˆ ai to maxi-
mize u ˆ(e ˆai
M,q ˆ ai)  p ˆ iq ˆ ai.
We call c the marginal cost of the base good and c ˆ the
marginal cost of manufacturing the add-on. Let q ˆ
S(p ˆ) represent
the equilibrium add-on demand of a sophisticate who knows she
will face a price p ˆ. Let q ˆ
M(p ˆ) represent the equilibrium add-on
demand of an uninformed myopic who initially overlooks add-on
prices because they are shrouded. We assume that there is a
unique monopoly price in the add-on market, given by
(9) p ˆ
m  arg max
p ˆ
p ˆ  c ˆ	1  q ˆ
Sp ˆ  q ˆ
Mp ˆ.
Now we characterize symmetric sequential equilibria.
PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that unshrouding makes all consumers
sophisticated (1). The price vector
(10) p  c  p ˆ  c ˆq  ˆp ˆ  
(11) p ˆ  p ˆ
m
supports a Shrouded Prices Equilibrium if and only if B  1,
where B is the debiasing ratio:
(12)
B 
cross subsidy to sophisticates from myopes
loss of social surplus for sophisticate demand
due to add-on markup
(13) 
p ˆ
m  c ˆq ˆ
Mp ˆ
m  q ˆ
Sp ˆ
m
	u ˆ
Sc ˆ  c ˆq ˆ
Sc ˆ  	u ˆ
Sp ˆ
m  c ˆq ˆ
Sp ˆ
m.
The beliefs of sophisticated consumers and educated myopes
are p ˆ  p ˆ
m for the add-on price at ﬁrms that shroud.
The proof is in Appendix 2.
This no-advertising result contains a boundary condition
that determines when advertising will appear: B  1.
44 Adver-
tising does not arise when the cross subsidies to sophisticates are
larger than the social welfare distortions due to price deviations
44. With the discrete demand model of Section II, the subsidy is p , the
distortion is e,s oB  B p /e. Condition B  1i s  
†, reproducing the
result of Proposition 1.
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late B ratios in different markets, and determine whether mar-
kets with high B values tend to be more shrouded.
To heuristically derive the result, consider another ratio that
is easier to directly interpret:
(14)
B 
loss-leader subsidy in base-good market
loss of consumer surplus (for sophisticate demand)
due to add-on markup
(15) 
p ˆ
m  c ˆ	1  q ˆ
Sp ˆ
m  q ˆ
Mp ˆ
m
	u ˆ
Sc ˆ  c ˆq ˆ
Sc ˆ  	u ˆ
Sp ˆ
m  p ˆ
mq ˆ
Sp ˆ
m.
A sophisticate at a shrouded ﬁrm will not defect to a mar-
ginal cost pricing ﬁrm if the loss-leader subsidy in the base-good
market exceeds the consumer welfare gain from switching to
marginal cost pricing in the add-on market (i.e., B  1). Since
aftermarket proﬁt generates loss-leader competition in the base-
good market, the loss-leader base-good subsidy is (p ˆ
m  c ˆ)[(1 
)q ˆ
S(p ˆ
m)  q ˆ
M(p ˆ
m)], which is the average proﬁt per customer
in the add-on market. The denominator of B is the sophisticates’
welfare loss from high markups in the add-on market. At mar-
ginal cost pricing (p ˆ  c ˆ), the sophisticate would realize add-on
utility of u ˆ
S(c ˆ)  c ˆq ˆ
S(c ˆ), but in the shrouded prices equilibrium
the sophisticate pays add-on price p ˆ
m and realizes a lower add-on
utility of u ˆ
S(p ˆ
m)  p ˆ
mq ˆ
S(p ˆ
m). Putting these results together, we
get the expression of B in equation (15). We can recover B
(equation (13)) by subtracting (p ˆ
m  c ˆ)q ˆ
S(p ˆ
m) from both the
numerator and denominator of B. Hence B  1 iff B  1.
III.C. Additional Models of Shrouded Equilibria
In this subsection we discuss some tractable variants of our
model that are empirically relevant. One variant is that of “ob-
servable prices but limited awareness.”
45 In this version the
prices of all ﬁrms are always observable, at no cost, by all con-
sumers. Myopes, however, just do not consider (or even think of)
the price of the add-on. In contrast, sophisticates costlessly ob-
serve and take into account the add-on prices of all ﬁrms. If a ﬁrm
“unshrouds,” it educates the myopes (or a fraction  of them), and
45. This variant is developed in the May 2004 version of the present paper,
which is available upon request.
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this variant are very close to the results of the present frame-
work. The results of Proposition 1—the discrete demand
model—do not change. The results of Proposition 4—the continu-
ous demand model—do not change, except that the add-on price
charged in the Shrouded Equilibrium falls between marginal cost
and the monopoly price. The reason is that, if a ﬁrm lowers the
price of the add-on, it gets more sophisticated consumers.
In another variant, myopic consumers simply underestimate
their use of the add-on.
46 This variant is relevant when consumers
are overoptimistic about the use of credit cards [Ausubel 1991] or
lines of credit [Landier and Thesmar 2005]. Such a microfoundation
would not change the results of the present paper.
The model also makes predictions about which attributes will
be shrouded, for a given good. Indeed, one can generalize the
model to a good with several shrouded attributes, which may
have different values for , e, and p . Our Proposition 1 also
applies to each attribute. There will be a Shrouded Prices Equi-
librium for an attribute if e/p  for that attribute. Hence an
attribute will be shrouded if its debiasing ratio B  p /e is
greater than 1.
III.D. Other Inﬂuences on Shrouding
To simplify exposition, we have ignored several additional
factors that inﬂuence the prevalence of shrouding. In this sub-
section we quickly discuss these factors, starting with the factors
that encourage shrouding. First, we have so far overlooked the
consumer entry decision, since we have assumed that all consum-
ers must buy a base good. When some consumers overlook add-on
costs, these myopic consumers may buy the base good when they
should avoid the market altogether [Ellison 2005]. Think of a
consumer who buys a $50 desk-jet printer without realizing that
the lifetime operating costs are at least ten times higher.
47 Firms
that compete by unshrouding high add-on prices will drive some
of these myopic consumers out of the base-good market. Hence,
consumer entry decisions are adversely affected by unshrouding
[Spence 1977].
46. Subsection 7.3 of our 2004 working paper.
47. At the moment, black and white text costs between 2 cents and 15 cents
per page, depending on the ink-jet printer. Color text costs more than black and
white text. A photographic image costs an order of magnitude more. Printing ten
pages per day at only 10 cents a page costs $1460 over four years.
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comes informed about the costly add-on at one ﬁrm, that con-
sumer takes account of the costly add-ons at all ﬁrms. However,
it is instead possible that unshrouding by one ﬁrm leads consum-
ers only to think about the unshrouded add-on at that single ﬁrm.
This narrow framing effect would impede unshrouding.
Third, if education/advertising is costly, then unshrouding
will again be impeded. Speciﬁcally, suppose that there is a ﬁxed
cost C of unshrouding. Then Proposition 4 is adjusted so that a
Shrouded Prices Equilibrium exists iff B  1, where B is deﬁned
as before except the numerator of B is incremented by kC, where
k  1i f0 and k equals the number of ﬁrms if  is very
large.
48 Analogously, Proposition 1 is adjusted so that a Shrouded
Prices Equilibrium exists iff p   kC  e. This implies that
shrouding is more pervasive when the market is less competitive.
Fourth, we have already mentioned that learning will accel-
erate unshrouding. However, innovation will create new add-ons
and new opportunities for shrouding.
Some forces besides learning, however, will favor unshroud-
ing. For instance, if consumers have heterogeneous tastes and
ﬁrms have heterogeneous add-ons, ﬁrms will advertise to enable
consumers to ﬁnd the base good with the right add-on. This
informative advertising will accelerate unshrouding.
Also, third party consumer education—e.g., magazines like
Consumer Reports—will accelerate unshrouding. However, vari-
ous impediments prevent such educational mechanisms from
working perfectly. Nonproﬁt educational organizations may be
underﬁnanced. Moreover, for-proﬁt educational organizations
may have incentives to give bad advice. For example, personal
ﬁnance magazines tend to recommend active portfolio manage-
ment, thereby justifying ongoing demand for these magazines.
Consumers may not know which adviser to trust.
IV. MEASURING AND REGULATING SHROUDING
In this section we discuss the measurement and regulation of
shrouding. We ﬁrst consider the problem of a regulator—or an
economic researcher—who wishes to empirically identify the ex-
48. The proof is a simple modiﬁcation of the proofs of Propositions 1 and 4,
with a Taylor expansion when  is very large.
527 SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES AND CONSUMER MYOPIAistence of shrouding. We then consider potential regulatory rem-
edies, emphasizing both the beneﬁts and pitfalls of these policies.
IV.A. Measuring Shrouding: Diagnostics
Five different empirical strategies can be used to identify the
existence of shrouding. First, researchers may conduct consumer
surveys. Such surveys would determine whether consumers at
the point of purchase are aware of the add-on costs that they will
later face. This corresponds to measuring 1  , an index of
average “consumer I.Q.” For example, Hall [2003] ﬁnds that only
3 percent of consumers who buy desk-jet printers know the asso-
ciated ink costs at the time they purchase the printer.
49 Of course,
such ignorance may or may not imply shrouding (e.g., ignorance
may result from exogenously high search costs). Consumer sur-
veys might also test for incorrect consumer expectations. For
example, at the point of purchase consumers could be asked to
estimate their ink costs. In shrouded equilibria, a large fraction of
consumers should underestimate such costs (and relatively few
consumers should overestimate those costs). Naturally, whenever
possible, surveys should use incentive-compatible designs. For
example, respondents could be told to estimate the ink costs of a
consumer who prints a speciﬁc number of pages per month and
uses nongeneric cartridges. With such a setup, accurate beliefs
could be ﬁnancially rewarded.
Second, researchers could test comparative statics assumed
or predicted by the model. The model assumes that consumers
show a greater response to up-front costs than to delayed costs.
More generally, the model assumes that consumers show a rela-
tively muted response to complex, contingent, camouﬂaged, dis-
tant, or disaggregated costs. Hausman [1979] and Hausman and
Joskow [1982] ﬁnd that consumers are far more responsive to the
store prices of appliances (e.g., refrigerators) than to the net
present value of the energy costs of operating the appliances.
Barber, Odean, and Zheng [forthcoming] show that mutual fund
investors are more sensitive to front-end loads than to ongoing
management fees. Hossain and Morgan [2005, 2006] ﬁnd that
consumers are more responsive to direct costs than to shipping
charges, and more generally ﬁnd ﬁeld evidence for shrouded
49. Ofﬁce of Fair Trading [2002] provides related evidence.
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50 Bertrand et al. [2005] ﬁnd that ﬁeld evidence for the
importance of framing in marketing materials. Researchers could
also study comparative statics by conducting controlled experi-
ments. A control group might receive standard (shrouded) mar-
keting materials. A treatment group would see the standard
marketing material as well as an unshrouded statement of the
add-on costs. Choi et al. [2005] conduct a ﬁeld experiment with
the structure above. They ﬁnd that MBA students avoid investing
in mutual funds with high management fees only when those fees
are explicitly unshrouded with an exogenous intervention.
Third, researchers could also determine whether ﬁrms gra-
tuitously increase the search cost for add-on prices. For instance,
ﬁrms may make add-on prices much harder to ﬁnd than other less
important information.
Fourth, researchers may conduct product audits, which de-
termine if base goods are being sold at loss-leader prices and if
add-ons are being sold at high markups. Of course, loss-leader
base goods and high markups on add-ons are only necessary
conditions for the existence of a shrouded equilibrium.
Fifth, regulators could look for learning effects implied by
shrouded equilibria. If fees are initially shrouded and consumers
encounter these fees as they gain more experience with a product,
then consumers will slowly learn to avoid these fees (see subsec-
tion III.A). Indeed, the logic of shrouding implies that learning
effects may generate reduced-form preference reversals. For ex-
ample, consider two bank account holders: one consumer just
triggered an add-on fee, and the other consumer did not. The
consumer who just “bought” the add-on will have a lower future
add-on demand compared with the consumer who did not buy the
add-on (since the latter consumer has a higher chance of still
being unaware of the add-on trap). Such dynamic demand rever-
sals contradict standard theories of add-on demand, which fea-
ture consumer heterogeneity and price discrimination. Agarwal
et al. [2005] ﬁnd learning effects in the retail banking market.
Other authors have argued that consumers with a better general
education get better prices in the marketplace. Woodward [2003]
ﬁnds that more educated consumers pay less in the mortgage
market controlling for default risk. Controlled ﬁeld experiments
can be designed to identify the effect of unshrouding.
50. Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson [1998] ﬁnd related experimental
evidence.
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Shrouded equilibria generate economic inefﬁciencies. How-
ever, regulatory remedies may not be available. It is difﬁcult to
outlaw ignorance or misleading (but accurate) marketing. If regu-
lators ﬁnd evidence for inefﬁcient shrouding, they have four types
of (imperfect) regulatory remedies that they might consider em-
ploying. Of course, the usual costs of regulation could easily
outweigh its possible beneﬁt.
51
First, regulators may compel disclosure. For example, regu-
lators could compel printer manufacturers to report the cost of
ink of printed page in a prominent place on the product. Indeed,
regulators have occasionally adopted such unshrouding policies
(e.g., nutritional labeling, energy usage labeling, and ﬁnancial
product labeling). However, disclosure laws for credit cards and
mortgages have met with only mixed success [Ausubel 1991;
Woodward 2003]. Indeed, in most markets it is difﬁcult to design
and enforce a successful disclosure regulation. For example, how
would one compel banks to make ﬁnancial service fees salient? A
bank account provides access to thousands of complementary
ﬁnancial services with associated fees (e.g., out-of-network ATM
fees, overdraft fees, bounced check fees, etc.). There is no sum-
mary statistic like ink cost per page that summarizes bank fees.
Regulations will probably not succeed if they simply change the
font size of the ﬁne print. Nobody yet knows how to compel
transparency. And it remains to be seen whether that is desir-
able—or possible—in practice.
Second, regulators could simply warn consumers to pay at-
tention to shrouded costs. For example, required “warning labels”
could be placed prominently on marketing materials, much like
cigarette warning labels. For example, mutual fund marketing
materials could be required to contain the following warning
label: “Investors are urged to check loads, management fees, and
other charges before investing in any mutual fund. If these fees
are not reported in marketing materials, do not forget to ask
about them.”
52
Third, regulators could make add-on markets more competi-
tive. For example, regulators could require that printer manufac-
51. See also Caplin and Leahy [2003] and Jolls and Sunstein [2005] for
discussions of policy with biased consumers.
52. The U. K. Treasury is in the midst of a broad expansion of transparency
regulation in the banking sector [Cruickshank 2000].
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Right now, most printer manufacturers prevent such entry by
designing cartridges with integrated patented printer heads (in-
stead of incorporating the printer head into the printer itself).
Hall [2003] contains an analysis of this anticompetitive practice.
The famous Kodak copier case [Klein 1993] presents another
example of an add-on market in which competition was effectively
eliminated, resulting in a Supreme Court decision against the
aftermarket monopoly. However, we tend to be skeptical of regu-
lations that prevent companies from exerting market power. Such
procompetitive regulations may have the unintended negative
consequence of discouraging technological innovation.
Finally, regulators may impose markup caps on shrouded
attributes. For example, Singapore regulates the markup the
hotel charges for the phone.
53 However, even if good theoretical
arguments exist for regulating shrouded fees, such regulations
put us on a slippery slope that may produce great unintended
harm. Mark-up regulations are often counterproductive.
V. CONCLUSION
Firms often shroud the negative attributes of their products,
particularly high prices for complementary add-ons. Following a
suggestion by Ellison [2005], we present a model of consumer
myopia that explains such shrouding. We identify conditions un-
der which shrouding survives in competitive equilibrium. We
show that competition will not induce ﬁrms to reveal information
that would improve market efﬁciency. Firms will not educate the
public about the add-on market, even when unshrouding is free.
A “curse of debiasing” suppresses unshrouding. Debiasing a
consumer improves consumer welfare, but no ﬁrm can capture or
even partially share these beneﬁts. Firms receive lower proﬁts
when they interact with debiased consumers. Debiased consum-
ers know how to avoid high-priced items. Moreover, ﬁrms cannot
drive away such debiased consumers without losing (proﬁtable)
myopic consumers as well. Debiased consumers can pretend to be
myopes, enabling the debiased consumers to take advantage of
the traps that ﬁrms set for myopes.
53. Singapore requires that hotels price their international phone calls at
marginal cost, plus a maximum of 30 Singaporean cents (which is about 20 U. S.
cents). See Singapore Telecommunications Act [2000]. We thank Ben Olken for
this example.
531 SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES AND CONSUMER MYOPIAThe economics of shrouding suggest some new research ques-
tions. We would like to measure the scope of ﬁrms’ efforts to
shroud information. We would like to measure the degree of
consumer myopia. Finally, we would like to know how quickly
learning unshrouds information and how quickly the fog returns
as ﬁrms introduce new products and “better” marketing
techniques.
APPENDIX 1: THE DEMAND FUNCTION D(x)
We deﬁne D(x) as the demand of a ﬁrm that offers an aver-
age perceived surplus x units greater than the average perceived
surplus provided by its competitors. We develop the microfoun-
dations for D(x) using random utility theory (see Anderson, de
Palma, and Thisse [1992] for an excellent review). We assume
that good i gives agent a decision utility equal to Uai  vi  pi 
εai, where εai is i.i.d. across ﬁrms i and agents a, with cumulative
distribution function F and density f  F. We interpret εai as a
tremble or an idiosyncratic consumer preference [McFadden
1981]. We normalize the mass of consumers to 1. The demand for
ﬁrm i is thus Di  P(vi  pi  εai  maxji vj  pj  εaj). We
will be looking for symmetric equilibria where a ﬁrm posts quality
v and prices p, while the other ﬁrms post the same quality v* and
price p*, and all ﬁrms have the same . In those cases, one can set
S  v  p and S*  v*  p*, introducing shorthand for the net
average surpluses. Then the demand for ﬁrm 1 is D1  D(S 
S*), where we deﬁne
(16) Dx  Px  ε1  max
j2,...,n
εj 


fεF
n1x  εdε.
See Perloff and Salop [1985] or Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse
[1992]. The demand depends only on the difference S  S*
between the surplus S offered by the ﬁrms, and the surplus S*
offered by its competitors. The following lemma characterizes the
symmetric equilibrium.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that ln f is concave, and that ﬁrms compete in
prices, and have identical costs c and values v, so that the
proﬁt of a ﬁrm charging p is (p  c)D(p*  p). Then there
is a unique symmetric equilibrium with p  c :
D(0)/D(0). Also,
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x
xDx  .
Proof of Lemma 1. The existence of the symmetric equilib-
rium is guaranteed by Caplin and Nalebuff [1991, Theorem 2 and
Proposition 7]. If marginal costs are c and proﬁts are (p 
c)D(p*  p), the ﬁrst-order condition is D(p*  p)  (p 
c)D(p*  p)  0. In the symmetric equilibrium, p  p*, and so
p  c  . Finally, equation (17) just reﬂects that a price p 
p* is an equilibrium if c  0.
A few cases have compact closed forms. If the noise is Gumbel
distributed, i.e., F(ε)  exp(e
ε), the demand is logistic: D(x) 
1/[1  (n  1)e
x]. If the noise is exponentially distributed with
density e
ε1ε0, the demand is D(x)  e
x[1  1x0(1  e
x)
n]/n.
If the noise is uniformly distributed in [1/2, 1/2], then D(x)  0
for x  1, D(x)  (1  x)
n/n for x  [1,0], D(x)  x  (1 
x
n)/n if x  [0,1], and D(x)  1 for x  1.
APPENDIX 2: LONGER DEVIATIONS
Proof of Proposition 1. The timeline is detailed in Section II.
We specify the sequential equilibrium of the game. We use the
terminology from Fudenberg and Tirole [1991, pp. 337–341]. We call
p* and p ˆ* the equilibrium prices at other ﬁrms for the base good and
the add-on, respectively, and we call p and p ˆ the prices at ﬁrm i.W e
call ˜ p ˆ and ˜ p ˆ* the beliefs of the sophisticated consumers about add-on
prices. We need to check sequential rationality and consistency of
the beliefs and actions. If a ﬁrm unshrouds p ˆ, then the sophisticated
consumers know p ˆ, which pins down their belief. If a ﬁrm shrouds p ˆ,
then sophisticated consumers rationally believe that the ﬁrm will
charge the monopoly price in period 2: ˜ p ˆ  p , as this is the proﬁt-
maximizing price for the ﬁrm that shrouds. Given the belief ˜ p ˆ  p ,
the sequentially rational action for the sophisticated consumers is to
exert the effort e. Hence sequential equilibrium very simply charac-
terizes the beliefs of sophisticated consumers and the newly edu-
cated myopes, who behave exactly like sophisticated consumers. The
beliefs of the myopes do not matter, as they just pick with equal
probability a ﬁrm among the ﬁrms that charge the lowest base good
prices.
We now check that ﬁrm i does not want to deviate from the
announced strategies.
Case 1: 
† and the Shrouded Prices Equilibrium.
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  p  p ˆ1p ˆp Dp*  p,
as the beliefs are ˜ p ˆ  ˜ p ˆ*  p  and the demand for the base
good of all the consumers depends only on p*  p. This
proﬁt is clearly maximized when p ˆ  p  so that
  p  p Dp*  p.
The base-good price p that solves the ﬁrst-order condi-
tion  (p  p )D(p*  p)  D(p*  p)  0 for p  p*
is p  p*   p   .
• Firm i can unshroud and pick p and p ˆ. By unshrouding its
add-on price, ﬁrm i educates some of the myopes and the
fraction of myopes becomes   (1  ). The myopes keep
ignoring the price of the add-on when deciding to buy the
add-on while the sophisticates incorporate it and will buy
it if and only if p ˆ  e.
—I fp ˆ  e,
  1  p  p ˆDp  p ˆ  p*  e
 p  p ˆDp*  p,
which is maximized when p ˆ  e. Otherwise, ﬁrm i can
increase p ˆ by a small positive increment, decrease p by
the same increment, and not change the demand of
sophisticated consumers while increasing strictly the
demand of naive consumers. Hence, the proﬁt can be
reexpressed as
  p  eDp*  p.
As 
†, this proﬁt is smaller than (p  p )D(p* 
p), the proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve by choosing to shroud
and price at p and p ˆ  p .
—I fp ˆ  e,
  p  p ˆ1p ˆp Dp*  p,
which is strictly smaller than (p  p )D(p*  p), the
proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve by choosing to shroud and
price at p and p ˆ  p .
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and price at p  p*   p  and p ˆ  p ˆ*  p .
Case 2: 
† and the Unshrouded Prices Equilibrium.
• Firm i can unshroud and pick p and p ˆ.
—I fp ˆ  e,
  1  p  p ˆDp  p ˆ  p*  e
 p  p ˆDp*  p,
which is maximized when p ˆ  e. Otherwise, ﬁrm i can
increase p ˆ by a small positive increment, decrease p by
the same increment, and not change the demand of
sophisticated consumers while increasing strictly the
demand of naive consumers. Hence (p  e)D(p* 
p). In equilibrium, the base-good price p solves the
ﬁrst-order condition,  (p  e)D(p*  p)  D(p* 
p)  0. This implies that p  p*  e  .
—I fp ˆ  e, only myopes buy the add-on, and
  p  p ˆ1p ˆp Dp*  p.
This proﬁt is clearly maximized when p ˆ  p . The proﬁt
is (p   p )D(p*  p), which is strictly smaller
than (p  e)D(p*  p), the proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve
by choosing to unshroud and price at p and p ˆ  e.
• Firm i can shroud and pick p and p ˆ and get a proﬁt equal
to
  p  p ˆ1p ˆp Dp*  p,
as the beliefs are ˜ p ˆ  p . One needs  rather than  in the
above expression, because the other ﬁrms unshroud, so
they educate a fraction  of the myopes. This proﬁt is
clearly maximized when p ˆ  p . The proﬁt is (p 
p )D(p*  p), which is also strictly smaller than the
proﬁt ﬁrm i could achieve by choosing to unshroud and
price at p and p ˆ  e.
• We conclude that the best response of ﬁrm i is to unshroud
and price at p  p*  e and p ˆ  p ˆ*  e.
Proof of Proposition 3. We follow closely the proof of Propo-
sition 1. The ﬁrm’s optimal value p ˆ must still be either e or p .
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  (1  ) represents the fraction of myopic
consumers after unshrouding. If the ﬁrm unshrouds, its proﬁt
depends on whether p ˆ  e or p ˆ  p :
(18)
p ˆ  e  max
p
p  	1  TS  TMM  TMSeDp*  p,
(19) p ˆ  p   max
p
p  p TMMDp*  p.
If it does not unshroud, its proﬁt is
(20)   max
p
p  TMMp Dp*  p.
To compare the proﬁts, observe that
	1  TS  TMM  TMSe  max TS, TMM  TMSe
 p TMM
as 
††. This implies that (p ˆ  e)  . Unshrouding and
posting a low price e for the add-on is not proﬁtable. Also, (p ˆ 
p ) by equation (19), (20), and   . Unshrouding and
posting a high price p  for the add-on is also not proﬁtable.
We conclude that whatever price the ﬁrm chooses to charge
for the add-on, unshrouding is not proﬁtable.
Proof of Proposition 4. We deﬁne the average demand in the
add-on market as
(21) q  ˆp ˆ  1  q ˆ
Sp ˆ  q ˆ
Mp ˆ.
In this proof we call p* and p ˆ*  p ˆ
m the equilibrium prices
described in the proposition. We check that the shrouded prices in
the proposition constitute an equilibrium.
First, it is clear that if a ﬁrm shrouds, the add-on price is the
monopoly price p ˆ
m. We check that the optimal base-good price is
the one announced in equation (10). Without loss of generality, we
take c  0 to simplify exposition.
54 The proﬁts are
  p  p ˆ
m  c ˆq  ˆp ˆ
mDp  p*.
If p is an equilibrium, /p  0a tp  p*. This implies that p 
(p ˆ
m  c ˆ)ˆ q (p ˆ
m)  D(0)/D(0)  , which is equation (10).
54. To go back to the general case, replace p by p  c.
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shrouds, and sets new prices p and p ˆ, while the other ﬁrms keep
shrouding and using the prices p* and p ˆ* given in equations
(10)–(11). A sophisticate facing price p ˆ in the aftermarket gets the
net utility
(22) v ˆp ˆ  max
q ˆ,e ˆ
u ˆe ˆ,q ˆ  p ˆq ˆ.
Call q ˆ(p ˆ) (or q ˆ
S(p ˆ) if there is an ambiguity) the associated choice
of add-on demand, and u ˆ(p ˆ)  v ˆ(p ˆ)  p ˆq ˆ(p ˆ) the gross utility.
The utility provided by the other ﬁrms is u
S*  p*  v ˆ(p ˆ*).
The ﬁrm’s proﬁt is
  p  p ˆ  c ˆq ˆp ˆDp  v ˆp ˆ  u
S*  xDx  p ˆ  c ˆq ˆp ˆ
 v ˆp ˆ  u
S*,
where x  p  (p ˆ  c ˆ)q ˆ(p ˆ) is the total proﬁt per customer.
Maximizing  (x, p ˆ) over p ˆ and noting that (22) and the envelope
theorem imply (/p ˆ)v ˆ(p ˆ)  q ˆ(p ˆ), we get
0 

p ˆ 	p ˆ  c ˆq ˆp ˆ  v ˆp ˆ  q ˆp ˆ  q ˆp ˆ  p ˆ  c ˆq ˆp ˆ
 p ˆ  c ˆq ˆp ˆ.
This implies that p ˆ  c ˆ  0. When a ﬁrm faces only sophisticated
consumers, it prices the add-on efﬁciently. So the highest proﬁt
the ﬁrm can get after deviating is
(23)   max
x
xDx  x*,
with x*  v ˆ(c ˆ)  u
S*.
As the predeviation proﬁt is , the ﬁrm does not want to
deviate if and only if
(24)   D0,
as D(0) is the predeviation proﬁt. Given equations (17) and (23),
and the fact that maxx xD(x  z) is nondecreasing in z, (24) is
equivalent to x*  . To ﬁnd the sign of x*  , we calculate
537 SHROUDED ATTRIBUTES AND CONSUMER MYOPIAx*    v ˆc ˆ  u
S*    v ˆc ˆ  v ˆp ˆ*  p*  
 v ˆc ˆ  u ˆ
Sp ˆ*  p ˆ*q ˆ
Sp ˆ*
 p ˆ*  c ˆq  ˆp ˆ* by 10 and 22
 v ˆc ˆ  u ˆ
Sp ˆ*  p ˆ*q ˆ
Sp ˆ*  p ˆ*  c ˆ
 	1  q ˆ
Sp ˆ*  q ˆ
Mp ˆ* by 21
 u ˆc ˆ  c ˆq ˆ
Sc ˆ  u ˆ
Sp ˆ*  c ˆq ˆ
Sp ˆ*  p ˆ*  c ˆ
 q ˆ
Mp ˆ*  q ˆ
Sp ˆ* by 22.
As the ﬁrm does not want to deviate if and only if x*  0, the
proposition is proved.
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